It is perhaps too generous to call it 'an unfinished project'. For it barely started. The 'project' in question here is 'citizenship after orientalism' that began its life with anticolonial struggles in the twentieth century and intensified in the years immediately after the second world war. The succession of liberation movements that shaped the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in the Americas can be seen as the first wave of decolonization that articulated not only a new image of man, but also of citizen. (The Haitian revolution of 1791 -1804 always remaining the originary moment of decolonization.) Despite successive declarations of independence in the Americas, it can hardly be accepted that the first wave brought emancipation from colonial domination. Nonetheless, anticolonial struggles inaugurated manifold projects of undoing, recovering, and reinventing political vocabularies and institutions with which to govern autonomous polities. Similarly, the second wave of anticolonial struggles in Africa and Asia in the twentieth century unleashed a variety of projects that still define contemporary politics of dependence and colonialism. The reference to 'unfinished projects' is then not accidental here. As Arthur reminds us in Unfinished Projects, decolonization and deorientalization constitute defining moments of the intellectual and political history of the long twentieth century to which we arguably still belong (2010, p. xxviii) . What marks this long century is that despite anticolonial struggles, decolonizing, and equally importantly deorientalizing, western political thought has barely begun. To put it differently, Fanon's project announced in The Wretched of the Earth that 'For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man [and, we must add, a new woman, together understood as a new citizen]' (Fanon 1963, p. 316 ) has barely begun.
It was in 1948 that Sartre had marked this struggle with his generalized conception of the condition of being dominated as 'negritude ' (1964) . True, Sartre was already speaking from the 'milieu' of Césaire (2000) , Memmi (2003) , Fanon (2008) , and Wright (1954) but his inflection brings out something surprisingly new, if not radical. We may well remember that he opens 'Black Orpheus' with a stunning declaration that 'here are black men standing, looking at us, and I hope that you -like me -will feel the shock of being seen' (Sartre 1964, p. 13) . The subject of speech and its audience are not those who inhabit that space called 'negritude' but 'us' who are shocked, perhaps for the first time, by being seen. For Sartre this shock was not the result of a 'recent' anticolonial struggle:
for three thousand years the white man has enjoyed the privilege of seeing without being seen; he was only a look -the light from his eyes drew each thing out of the shadow of its birth; the whiteness of his skin was another look, condensed light. The white man -white because he was man, white like daylight, white like truth, white like virtue -lighted up the creation like a torch and unveiled the secret white essence of beings. (Sartre 1964, p. 13) Making this declaration when introducing African and West Indian poets to French readers, Sartre insisted that the black poet ' . . . must oblige those who have vainly tried throughout the centuries to reduce him to the status of a beast, to recognize that he is a man [and, we must add, first, a woman, together understood as a citizen]' (1964, p. 18) . For Sartre negritude was not simply an attitude, being against Europe and colonization. It was also, and more importantly and effectively, an act: 'negritude is portrayed in these beautiful lines of verse more as an act than as a frame of mind.' And, ' . . . this act is an inner determination: it is not a question of taking the goods of this world in one's hands and transforming them; it is a question of existing in the middle of the world ' (1964, p. 36) . Negritude was this obligation to oneself and the other. It is for this reason 'the negro's act is first of all an act on oneself ' (1964, p. 37) . The black poet speaking in French with 'the density of . . . words thrown into the air like stones from a volcano ' (1964, p. 33 ) was for Sartre carrying out an act of inner determination that exceeded the condition of negritude, or, more precisely, elevated it to a language of emancipation precisely because this 'poetry -which seems racial at first -is actually a hymn by everyone for everyone ' (1964, p. 316) . If negritude was an act, it was one that not only constituted a man and a woman, but also a citizen -a political subject; 'political' because it instigated obligation to the self and other, and 'subject' because it made itself appear in the world.
The language, or rather vocabulary, or shall we say 'hymn', with which to oblige oneself, the other, and everyone to recognize that one is not beast but a man or a woman, and we must add, also a citizen, is perhaps the essence of anticolonial struggles. Or rather, as Sartre recognized, revolting against the condition of being oppressed requires simultaneous revolutionizing of language to act upon oneself and the other. But the language of politics and the vocabulary of citizenship are as sedimented as the history of negritude, which Sartre saw as having existed for '3000 years'. It is in these 3000 yearsfrom Ancient Greece to modern Euro-America -that the figure not only of man (and much later of woman) but also of the citizen occupies a special place. This invented tradition marks out man and woman from citizen and designates the latter as the subject of politics or, more precisely, as the political subject. Notwithstanding the disagreement between Agamben (1998, pp. 126 -135) and Derrida (2001, pp. 3 -24) on what to make of this distinction between 'man' (and 'woman') and 'citizen', which Arendt (1973, pp. 267 -302) had most clearly articulated as a question, it taught us how it functions in differentiating those who are considered as proper subjects of politics and those who are not. For Agamben, the distinction between zoē (man and woman) and bios (citizen) meant an opposition: the former standing for bare life while the latter signifying a political life. Derrida remained sceptical of this distinction not least because they were opposed terms, but also because he did not think that bare life (man and woman) and political life (citizen) could be separated as distinct terms. Yet, what did not seem to occur to Arendt, Agamben, or Derrida was how the distinction between man and citizen may have derived from a series of divides between the colonized and the colonizer, the orient and the occident, and the south and the north. On three occasions above I added, 'citizen' to 'man' and 'woman' precisely to draw attention to that difference that may have derived from the experience of coloniality.
E.F. Isin 564
Was it not Fanon (1963) who called this distinction into question? By responding to Sartre's use of the notion 'negritude' and resignifying it as a figure that acts upon himself, he insisted that this figure shouts a hymn for everyone not only as a man or a woman but also as a citizen. For it is Fanon who articulates, or, rather, dreams of articulating, a subject who is neither nationalist nor national and neither colonial nor cosmopolitan; a subject who becomes a citizen by participating in the formation of a people to come, a people that has not yet been imagined or invented. It is Fanon who shows how from the ruins of negritude an 'invented soul' can arise as a radical citizen (1963, p. 197) .
With Fanon what we witness is the emergence of a political subject, a subject that becomes political. Ironically, it was almost exactly at that moment that Foucault announced a wager at the end of his archaeology of human sciences that ' . . . man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea ' (1973, p. 387) . Little did it appear to anyone then (or perhaps we are recognizing it now) that Foucault's wager was (quite unbeknownst to him) about decentring not man (or woman) as such but a 'western' figure. After all, is not the scientific man (and, much later, woman) as autonomous subject an invention of 'western' science cast against an 'orient' that lacked that subject? What Foucault may have unintentionally exposed then and we understand better now is, as Mignolo (2003, p. 452) would put it, that ' . . . modernity and coloniality are two sides of the same coin. ' When Said (1994) investigated orientalism, by which colonialism constituted man and woman as a beast rather than man or woman, let alone a citizen, and called the colonized a subject, he both simplified and complicated three genealogies that had until then remained distinct: orientalism as a field or discipline that takes the orient as its object; a representation, if exotic and eroticizing, of lands and people deemed to be 'oriental'; and imperial projects through which lands and peoples were colonized. If we designate each as scientific, cultural, and political forms of orientalism, what made them effective and performative was their relations with each other: how political subjectivities were misrecognized, interpreted, and cultivated through institutions was deeply related to the ways in which forms of knowledge were constituted about colonial subjects and were represented in cultural forms. These relations were never stable or homogenous. Rather, fluid and heterogeneous practices marked sometimes conflicting, sometimes agreeable and sometimes violently differentiated ideas about 'oriental subjects' and their political subjectivity. By political subjectivity, we mean the ways in which they could or could not take up positions deemed productive of the capacity of being ruled and ruler. With so many readings not only of orientalism but also of Said's Orientalism, it has become vitally important to recognize that the performative force of political orientalism is that it functions as a strategy of differentiation through a series of absences and presences in order to establish a hierarchical order of things that it differentiates: examples include man and woman, man and citizen, the orient and the occident, and the colonizer and the colonized. It is in this sense of being able to instigate dividing practices that political orientalism functions as a strategy of government of colonial territories and colonized peoples (and of government of those who govern them).
Although scientific, cultural and political forms of orientalism have different histories and geographies, these implicate relations between now and then as well as here and there in intertwined and complicated ways. Geographic representations of 'occident' and 'orient', for example, institute historic representations such as 'developed' and 'developing' and establish relations of hierarchy, absence and presence between them. Such hierarchies may shape how disciplines organize themselves (scientific orientalism), how aesthetics of the sensible about these historic and geographic things are distributed (cultural orientalism), and how governing colonial subjects requires governing ourselves (political orientalism). It Citizenship Studies 565 is through movements of these different forms of orientalism that distinctions between 'man', 'woman', and 'citizen' are maintained and projected onto other divisions. The upheavals in social and political thought (re)read in the context of the anticolonial struggles of the long twentieth century indicate, at least to me, that theorizing 'man', 'woman', and 'citizen' and their associated concepts such as politics, polity, city, and state (if not nation) cannot occur within an ostensibly sui generis (rather than an invented) tradition of Euro-American thought. Instead, if we are to turn a new leaf and work out a new concept of man, woman, and citizen, we will have to (re)begin with coloniality as the condition of modernity.
It is this relationship between modernity and coloniality that orientalism has especially exposed. Mignolo's The darker side of the Renaissance (2003) was a critical watershed in revealing this relationship. Mignolo effectively illustrated that 'critical perspectives on Western values and ways of thinking have much to gain from understanding colonial situations: the darker side of the European Renaissance and Western modernity, perhaps, but also the brighter side of a utopian future ' (2003, p. 317) . Mignolo observes that studies of the birth of Europe are invariably focused on Europe rather than its relationship with the world. By contrast, he insists, ' . . . it is not just the perspective (a way of seeing) that is at stake but the locus of enunciation (a way of saying) ' (2003, p. 324) . It is in this sense that the divides between man and woman, on the one hand, and the citizen on the other, cannot be written as a history of the western subject but only in relation to an other, the colonial subject. Yet, as Mignolo says the fact that it was in the sixteenth century that the idea of Europe as Christian was consolidated also has much to do with colonialism (2003, pp. 325 -26) .
If republica christiana became located geographically in Europe, Europe would not only become more and more located in the West as opposed to the East occupied by the Islamic world but would create a distinction between Western and Eastern Christians. (Mignolo 2003, p. 316) If we are studying how incommensurable cultures encounter each other, cultural relativism -regarding them as autochthonous and insular entities in their own right -may be appropriate. But when cultures begin to mingle, translation between them becomes inevitable and it is important to understand the agents of this translation both as observers and participants. In order to deal with problems of cultural relativism, construction of the other, and understanding subjectivation, Mignolo describes such a process and its interpretation as pluritopic hermeneutics. By 'pluritopic hermeneutics' Mignolo means an ' . . . interactive concept of knowledge and understanding that reflects on the very process of constructing (e.g. putting in order) that portion of the world to be known ' (2003, p. 15) . He opposes this against comparative studies -a fashion of telling a story from different points of view to show how the invention of reality is relative. By contrast, what a pluritopic approach emphasizes is not cultural relativity or multiculturalism, but the social and human interests in the act of telling a story as political intervention. The politics of enacting and of constructing loci of enunciation are at stake, rather than the diversity of representations resulting from differential locations in telling stories or building theories. (Mignolo 2003, p. 15) It is here that representations and enactments become opposing ways of understanding cultures.
If we assume that every culture in the world has to have activities similar to ours, although differently conceptualized, we have a false start, since one culture (the one to which the humanities and the social sciences belong) is attributed a universal value, and the possibility of looking at things otherwise is automatically ruled out. Thus, while comparisons continue to be made from the European perspective, questions in a different direction are seldom asked. (Mignolo 2003, p. 332) This is often what orientalism produces: subjects who are unaware of or unwilling to consider the locus of enunciation of their own valuations and evaluations and thus wittingly or otherwise assuming Eurocentrism -i.e. representing other ways of doing politics from a perspective that is always superior.
If human beings are conceived not as the mirror of nature (e.g. being in and knowing of a world outside themselves) but as developing activities in order to avoid death, to reproduce, to have pleasure, and to expand their domain of interactions (in any of the diverse possible forms such an expansion may take), then the realm of enactments rather than the realm of representations takes precedence in understanding human cultures. (Mignolo 2003, p. 333) To put it another way, as Derrida did, we have come to recognize that . . . there is no self-relation, no relation to oneself, no identification with oneself, without culture, but a culture of oneself as a culture of the other, a culture of the double genitive and of the difference to oneself. The grammar of the double genitive also signals that a culture never has a single origin. (Derrida 1992, pp. 10 -11) Was Derrida's project -if seen under another heading -imagining a Europe after orientalism? Was his insistence on reading the multiple and heterogeneous origins of Europe (Jewish, Arabic, Christian, Roman, Germanic, Persian as well as Greek) an attempt to inherit -and thus steer -a Europe different from how orientalism would have us see it? It was Derrida who insisted that . . . it is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but of a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other, indeed -and this is perhaps something else altogether -toward the other of the heading, which would be the beyond of this modern tradition, another border structure, another shore. (Derrida 1992, p. 29) If so, how well have we heeded the challenge of not only inheriting but also inventing a different Europe?
Over the last two decades, critical theories of citizenship have effectively disentangled nationality and citizenship by historically and geographically situating their contested and contestable institutions. In this way, it has also been effectively shown that the nationality -citizenship -state apparatus is undergirded by an orientalist assumption that citizenship is a European invention. Moving from citizenship as membership to citizenship as political subjectivity, critical theory has relentlessly documented various practices through which social groups articulate claims to address injustices. As Balibar put it
The great equation instituted by modern states between citizenship and nationality (which is what gives the idea of 'popular sovereignty' its content) then begins to function against the grain of its democratic signification: nationality no longer appears as the historical form in which collective liberty and equality are constructed but is made into the very essence of citizenship, the absolute community that all others must reflect. (Balibar 2004, p. 37) If it has now become very difficult to imagine citizenship merely as nationality or membership in the nation-state, this is at least, in part, because of the anticolonial struggles and the project of reimagining citizenship (as political subjectivity) after orientalism that they precipitated. If it has become difficult to sustain the orientalist assumption, the question that now arises is how do we investigate citizenship as political subjectivity after orientalism? Clearly, the key theoretical move here is the accent on 'after'. It signifies at least two meanings. The first draws attention to the question of how we should consider citizenship as political subjectivity after the publication of Said's Orientalism in 1978. As I mentioned earlier, Orientalism has become a turning point in troubling the ways in Citizenship Studies 567 which we understand knowledge about various worlds and the ways in which these worlds related to each other. Yet, Orientalism and the knowledges it has spurred and spawned have primarily focused on cultural representations. Hence, it is arguably more appropriate to call this concern 'cultural orientalism'. Other distinct (though related) forms of orientalism such as scientific, political, and legal have received much less attention. The reasons and effects of this are too intricate and involved to discuss here but there is a yawning gap in our understanding of the ways in which juridico-political discourses have effectively constituted differences between and amongst worlds, and then rank-ordered these differences. We have attempted to draw attention to the role 'citizenship' as a juridico-legal institution has played in this process (Isin 2002 (Isin , 2005 . The second meaning of 'after' orientalism concerns the question of how we should rethink and transform the juridico-legal institution of citizenship having critiqued and revealed its orientalist origins. The concept of 'political subjectivity' becomes crucial because an essential component of the juridico-legal institution of citizenship is the formation of political subjects either with the right to have rights or making rights claims. Who has the capacity to govern themselves, who lack such capacities and the discourse that defines such capacities become effective elements of the formation of political subjects and their subjectivity. With these two meanings of 'after' the project 'citizenship after orientalism' moves through three related but distinct ways for working out a new conception of political subject, as Fanon wished, 'for Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity'. We may call the first way 'undoing citizenship'. Similar to an approach that Sartre called 'negativity' this involves 'deorientalizing' and 'decolonizing' the ways in which citizenship has been instituted through juridico-political practices. Projects such as 'provincializing Europe' (Chakrabarty 2000) or critiques of the Eurocentric (Blaut 1993) can be thought of as examples of such 'undoing'.
The second way can be considered as 'uncovering citizenship'. Similar to what Foucault (2003, pp. 1 -19) called 'subjugated knowledges', the task here is to reveal forms of knowledge that were masked by juridico-political discourse which not only concealed them but also disqualified them as being below the standard thresholds of legitimacy and acceptability (2003, p. 7) . Mignolo, for example, recovers concepts of 'city' and 'citizenship' in Aztec history and shows how they were concealed during the colonizing process. He notes that ' . . . if Tollan is equivalent to city and toltecáyotl to civilization, then all the inhabitants of a Tollan who follow the rules of toltecáyotl are citizens (from civitas, in the west, from where "citizens" and "civilization" were derived)' (Mignolo 2006, p. 316 ). Yet, he argues, . . . for Christians, Tollan was a place inhabited by barbarians and pagans; and when the very idea of citizen emerged in the west (in the eighteenth century), the memories of Tollan had been already significantly (if not totally) erased from the memory of Mexican indigenous memory. (Mignolo 2006, p. 316) Similarly, we have argued elsewhere that concepts of 'medina', which means city, and 'medeniye', which means citizenship, became disqualified in Ottoman politics during the 'modernization' process of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (Isin 2007) .
The third way can be called 'reinventing citizenship', with a focus on forging a new conception of the political subject from unconcealed knowledges. Admittedly, this is perhaps the most difficult way as it cannot be accomplished only in theory. It requires analysis of how people enact citizenship through 'acts' of citizenship that invent new ways of becoming political subjects as citizens. We have, for example, suggested how the creation E.F. Isin 568 of pious foundations through an Islamic institution called 'waqf' especially by Ottoman women can be considered as acts of citizenship Ü stündag 2008, Isin 2011) .
These three ways of working out how to understand new political subjects after orientalism (undoing, uncovering, and reinventing) are in the early stages of their development. It is in this sense that I described 'citizenship after orientalism' as an 'unfinished project'. This special issue of Citizenship Studies features eight articles written by members of the Oecumene research group, and nine articles drawn from the project's first symposium entitled 'Opening the Boundaries of Citizenship', held on 6 -7 February 2012 at the Open University. In addition, we have invited Ranabir Samaddar to contribute to the issue with an epilogue. By reminding us the figure of the insurgent citizen that was articulated through popular constitutionalism, Samaddar argues that this figure is not based on any positive definition of justice, but it asserts that justice begins with the demand that an injustice has been committed and that it must end. This figure is heterogeneous and discontinuous whose traces can be found in other scenes of politics where people act as if they are citizens. The articles that follow illustrate these various ways of working out new political subjects: undoing, uncovering, and inventing. But, it must be said, each does not unambiguously fit into one of these ways of investigating citizenship after orientalism. Each crosses the boundaries of these ways. Nonetheless, I hope that both authors and readers will find the ways in which I read these contributions are both analytically promising and performatively evocative.
By investigating juridico-political practices through which citizenship is instituted and certain political subjectivities are brought into being, Jack Harrington, Zaki Nahaboo, Leticia Sabsay, Andrew Baldwin, Lauren Banko, and Małgorzata Jakimów contribute to deorientalizing and decolonizing citizenship. Jack Harrington illustrates the complicated workings of political orientalism by focusing on James Mill's History of British India (1817). This work, which deeply influenced British understanding of India in the nineteenth century, conceived empire as the interaction between two civilizations at different stages of development. Harrington shows that the logic of political orientalism Mill clearly articulates is not one which simply holds an ostensibly inferior image of Indian political subjectivity but rather one which aims at developing supposedly universal and innate capacities that remain stifled by the practices of oriental society. Harrington raises the difficult question of whether we should consider Mill as sufficiently aware of his locus of enunciation or reproducing another version of political orientalism. Zaki Nahaboo investigates resonances and affinities between Edmund Burke's colonial discourse in the eighteenth century and liberal -pluralist multiculturalism in the twentieth century. He illustrates how both function, albeit differently, as species of difference management reproducing and at times subverting political orientalism. The question Nahaboo raises is to what extent we consider modern multiculturalism as having critiqued or even inhibited political orientalism and to what extent modern multiculturalism carries its traces. Leticia Sabsay illustrates how the celebrated emergence of the sexual citizen in Western democracies since the 1990s has more recently resulted in its rearticulation as a colonizing and orientalizing strategy in projects of democratizing sexuality. This happens when the norms of the emerging sexual citizen are used to measure whether non-Euro-American subjects either within or outside Euro-America qualify as citizens. Sabsay effectively shows how the hegemony of a western mode of understanding the sexual subject who would become, by virtue of this sexuality, a potential claimant of rights, defines the limits of who can be considered potential sexual political subjects and what forms sexuality has to take to be considered political. Andrew Baldwin demonstrates how political orientalism works in the present through invoking the future rather than the past. By focusing on the Citizenship Studies 569 figure of the climate-change induced migrant, he shows that this figure is produced with the logic of political orientalism. Baldwin shows that the figure is produced by reference to a future when certain 'races' code certain places. If Baldwin shows how the future is invoked to create the figure of the migrant in the present, Lauren Banko documents how the past is so strongly present in one of the most vexed questions of citizenship of the long twentieth century. Banko shows how the creation of Palestinian citizenship under the British colonial mandate between 1918 and 1925 aimed to produce 'apolitical' citizenship and how it was resisted by the Arabs. This apolitical citizenship, one without civil or political rights, was meant to satisfy the mandate terms and the Jewish national home policy. By the time that citizenship was conferred, the Arabs of Palestine had already articulated alternatives to it. The tension between these two images of citizenship finds their resonances in the present conflict that engulfs the project of the Israeli state. Małgorzata Jakimów documents how Chinese authorities reproduce an orientalist conception of citizenship in understanding and regulating internal migration from rural to urban areas in China. Yet, echoing both Derrida and Mignolo, Jakimów illustrates that the ostensibly alternative citizenship practices in non-Western places are always already marked with Western ideas of citizenship through orientalism. With Deena Dajani, Aya Ikegame, Alessandro Marino, Tara Atluri, and Gabrielle Hosein, the focus shifts from undoing citizenship to uncovering subjugated knowledges of political subjectivity. Deena Dajani explores three Arabic performative traditions that can be interpreted as acts through which people come to constitute themselves as political subjects. She renders these acts as political and illustrates how they produce unfamiliar or unexpected political subjectivities. She finds these unfamiliar or unexpected practices useful for interrogating the dominant understanding of political subjects as 'making rights claims' and demonstrates that Arabic performative traditions render different, if more complicated, images of political subjectivity. Aya Ikegame explores how various social and public services provided by mathas (religious institutions) headed by gurus in South India can be interpreted as also providing grounds for cultivating political subjectivities. She questions the distinction made between the religious and the political and instead describes how people practice citizenship through acts of devotion. Alessandra Marino explores how acts of writing intervene in mobilizing a struggle against the construction of a mega dam in India. By investigating how Arundhati Roy was called upon to act through writing, Marino shows the emergence of subjects of resistance acting against the progressive narratives of nationalism and the orientalist logic of development. Atluri critically discusses the occidentalist notion of sexual citizenship, and calls for 'the need to question the epistemologies of citizenship and understandings of sexuality' that this category implies. Exposing some of the orientalist assumptions and uses of sexual citizenship, she argues that through the reduction of sexed and gendered body performances to the logic of rights, non-western sexual practices and racialized bodies are colonized. Against the backdrop of this imperialist impulse, the article analyses the case of the Indian Hijras to contend that 'sexual citizenship after orientalism might move outside of market-driven cultures of sex as property and legal entitlement to revisit the embodied spirit of sacrifice and love that defines other traditions of sexual politics'. Hosein offers a compelling insight into how Hindu Indian Mas makers -masquerade makers of the Caribbean Carnival -constitute themselves as political subjects in Trinidadian Carnival (and by extension public life). She illustrates how the incorporation of new ethnicities enable improved social status and how negotiating and contesting authorities over love for mas as symbolic struggles open up space for recognition in public life. The performative spectacle of the Carnival allows us to think of acts of citizenship that E.F. Isin 570 challenge expected and familiar ways of becoming citizens -at once playful and august, ceremonious, and solemn.
With Iker Barbero, Lisa Pilgram, Parvati Nair, Federico Oliveri, Kim Rygiel, and Steven Wilmer, we begin to get a glimpse of how citizenship as political subjectivity may look like after orientalism. They document practices and acts where forms of citizens are enacted. With a focus on Europe, Iker Barbero demonstrates how citizenship and border regimes are created in order to construct and control certain migrant groups, especially Muslims. This multiple strategy could be assembled under the concept of 'neo-orientalization of immigration', this is, the construction of the 'other' as the illegal, the anti-social, the criminal, the terrorist immigrant, in the end the 'anti-citizen' with the aim of legitimizing the domination, the implementation of selective control policies, and the redefinition of the European and nation-state identities. Lisa Pilgram demonstrates that while abstract arguments are raging about the compatibility between Sharia law and Western state law, practically there is already an emerging hybrid British-Muslim family law. Parvati Nair draws a fascinating comparison between the politics of resistance of migrants and that of the Indignados movement in Spain. She asks 'to what extent can both indignation and immigration be understood through shared concerns, demands and modes of resistance?' Frederico Oliveri turns our attention to Italy but with a similar perspective to Nair in that he illustrates how, through their struggles, migrants become activist citizens by making claims to citizenship rights that they do not have. Kim Rygiel turns our attention to another kind of space -neither city nor state -where migrants increasingly find themselves suspended in time: camps. But Rygiel concentrates on political subjectivities that emerge from the struggles of those who are suspended in time and space. Rygiel argues that camps as sites of resistance in their own right have also become the sites of political protest waged by detained non-citizens and citizens joining in solidarity outside at these sites. This is a demonstration of solidarities across figurative and literal boundaries that divide non-citizens from citizens. S.E. Wilmer demonstrates how playing with citizenship can produce creative and inventive political subjectivities. He examines how art works by two groups in particular, Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK) and Janez Janša, work with performative subversive gestures, or acts, with the effect of exposing nationalist ideologies through irony. He illustrates that these art practices firstly expose practices of national government that jeopardise the (irregular) migrant and the stateless and which are sought to be kept hidden from the public eye. Secondly, performative acts by NSK and Janez Janša use the tactic of 'subversive over-identification' to oppose ideological signifiers and raise uncomfortable questions about prevailing national ideologies.
What brings these articles together is not their ostensible objects of analysis being elsewhere, outside Europe. Rather, their ways of documenting and analysing the undoing, uncovering, and reinventing citizenship are their common grounds for investigating citizenship as political subjectivity.
